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This paper examines the endogenous dynamics of the social structure of a city where 
the spatial repartition of amenities is endogenously modified by the spatial repartition of 
social groups. We start from the well known fact that, in most European cities, central 
locations are occupied by rich households; while in American cities, they are occupied by 
poor households. In a standard urban model without amenities, for rich households to locate 
downtown, their unit transport cost must be very high compared to the poor. Bruckner and alii 
(1999) show that, when there are historical amenities mainly located in the city center, we no 
longer need a high differential between transport costs: if demand for amenities by the rich is 
strong enough, this advantage could attract the rich households in the city centre. This 
explanation fits well with the fact that the most European cities have a long history, with the 
consequence that they accumulated many amenities in their city centre.  
However, the paper by Brueckner and alii is purely static and does not explicitly 
consider the historical dimension of the process generating amenities. Our model explicitly 
takes account of time: at every period, the equilibrium spatial structure of the city is 
determined by the transport costs and by the spatial repartition of amenities; but, between 
periods, the spatial repartition of amenities changes, rich households generating local 
amenities in the locations they occupy, and then the spatial structure of the city changes.   
We show that the city may have several long term equilibria. We explicitly analyse 
two of them: an “American equilibrium” with the poor living in the centre and the rich in the 
periphery, and a “European equibrium” with the rich living in the centre and the poor in the 
periphery. We show that the conditions for the existence of a European equilibrium are more 
restrictive than the conditions for the existence of an American equilibrium. We compare the 
two equilibria from an efficiency point of view. The results show that an American structure 




Our paper examines the formation of the social structures of the cities where the space 
distribution of the amenities is modified in an endogenous way by the space distribution of the 
social classes. We start from the known fact that the majority of the European cities are 
characterized by a central localization of the rich households and a localization of the poor 
households towards the periphery. In contrast, the majority of the American cities know an 
opposite scheme of localization: the poor live in the central areas and the rich persons in 
suburbs. 
In the standard urban models, the rich households are attracted by the central 
localizations of the city, when their transportation costs are much higher compared to the poor 
households. Another explanation was proposed by Brueckner & alii (1999), based on the 
theory of the local amenities. The European cities are characterized by a longer history. Many 
of their centers have a strong advantage in terms of amenities on the peripheries (monuments, 
parks, boulevards, fine architectures, etc), which are the consequence of this history. If the demand of the rich households for the amenities is strong enough, such an advantage can be 
sufficient to attract the rich households towards the central localizations, which corresponds 
well to their social structure.  
The model of Brueckner & alii (1999) is purely static and it does not take into account 
the historical dimension of the process which generates the amenities. Since the historical 
development plays an essential role in the formation of the urban structures, we have created a 
dynamic model: at each period, the equilibrium space structure is determined by the spatial 
distribution of the amenities. Between periods, this distribution changes, because the rich 
households generate amenities in the areas which they occupy, but also in their vicinity. 
  Our model belongs to the models without durability of the capital. This type of models 
was developed initially by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967) and Muth (1969) within a static 
framework. In our model, the basic assumption is that at each period, in the neighbourhoods 
where are localised the rich households, but also in their vicinity, the level of amenities 
increases (modern amenities), this increase being added at the level of amenities inherited 
from the previous period (the modern amenities become historical amenities). In same time, 
the amenities decrease in the rich neighbourhoods, near the poor areas, because their vicinity 
constitutes a desamenity for the rich households.   
We show that the endogenous generation of amenities has like consequence the 
existence of several long term equilibria. We carry an analysis on two types of equilibria: an 
American equilibrium, with the poor living the center and the rich person periphery and a 
European equilibrium, with the rich households occupying the center and the poor periphery. 
The conditions of existence of a European equilibrium are more restrictive and included in the 
conditions necessary for an American equilibrium. We compare the two equilibria from an 
efficiency point of view. The results show that an American structure is more efficient 
The first part presents the theoretical model, with these assumptions. Then we are 
analyzing the possibility of existence of multiple equilibria with an efficiency comparison. 
The last section is devoted to the conclusions. 
 
2 THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
2.1 Assumptions 
  We created a simple model, purely residential, where the connection between periods 
is given by the transformation of the modern amenities into historical amenities. 
   We place our model in the monocentric urban models tradition (Alonso, 1964) where 
the CBD (Central Business District) is represented by a point in space and the only spatial 
variable is the distance to the center. 
  There are two social classes, the rich and the poor households, which are differentiated 
by their income respectively y1 and y2 and by their preferences for the amenities. The utility of 
the households depends on the consumption of the composite good (z) whose price is 
standardized with the unit, on the living space (s) and on the local amenities level (a(x)). We 
are using a Cobb-Douglas utility function  ( ) ( ) ,, () ()
i t
i Uz s ax z sax
t γ αβ = , where 1 α β += . 
The rich households have stronger preferences for the amenities than the poor  12 () γ γ >  and 
by simplification purposes, we can pose  1 γ γ =  and 2 0 γ = . This assumption is explained by 
the fact that we the amenities are considered as a superior good. The transportation costs are 
linear to the distance and identical for the two social categories:  . We choose 
identical transportation costs in order to avoid the effects of the differentiated costs on the 
structure of the city and to highlight the role played by the amenities. 
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t




  Our model is in an open-city framework (there are no migration costs): the utility level 
of each category is exogenous and equal at the national level (u
t
i) and the population of the 
city is endogenous. 
 
2.2. Model equations 
Our model is structured as a succession of static equilibiums. At each period we are 
analyzing the equilibrium localization of each social category and the effects on the amenities. 
These effects will be taken into account during the next periods and will have an influence in 
the new decisions of localization. 
At each period, the households maximize their utility under budgetary constraint: 
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where   is the commuting cost to CBD and  ()
t
i Cx ( )
t R x  is the market urban rent at the 
period t. 
At equilibrium, each household will reach a utility level equal to the national level u
t
i. 
We define the bid-function as the maximum price per space unit which the household can pay 
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 where  A
α β βα = . 
The city’s structure will be the result of competition for the space between the various 
uses (residential, agricultural). Each localization will be occupied by the strongest bidder. 
Thus, the urban rent will be the higher envelope of the bid-functions and the agricultural rent.  
{ } () m a x () ,
tt
i
t R xx ψ = R A      (4) 
 where 
t RA  is the agricultural rent (the opportunity cost of land) at the period t. 
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We are using a binary spatial variable K(x) to define the social category of the 
household which lives at distance x of center:  
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  The border of the city is determined where the bid-function of the category localised in 
the peripheral zone of the city is equal to the agricultural rent:   
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The key of the model, which makes the connection between periods, is the amenities 
function a
t(x). During the first period the amenities are constant a
0(x)=a. At each period t+1, 
in the zones occupied by the rich households, the amenities increase with a unit compared to 
the previous period. These amenities also increase in the vicinity of these zones. If we move 
away from the rich zones, the positive effect decreases. We are making the assumption that 
this decreasing is linear with the distance. It is considered that d represents the distance where 
there are no more positive externalities. 
The amenities are influenced negatively by the proximity of the poor zones. Thus, the 
level of amenities starts to decrease not at the point of segregation but a certain front distance. To simplify the writing of the model, we consider this distance equal to d, what we called the 
externality distance (the maximum distance where one feels the effect of vicinity between the 
social categories).  
For example, if there is only one segregation point (the city is divided into two 
completely segregated zones) and if the rich households live in the peripheral zone, the 
amenity function at the second period is represented in Graphic 1. 
The dissymmetry of the amenity function in graphic 1 is explained by the fact that in 
the vicinity of the segregation point [ ] , ss x xd xd ∈ −+ , there is the double effect: the 
amenities also increase in the poor zone [ ] , s s x xd x ∈− , because of the proximity of rich 
households, but there is a negative effect in the rich zone [ ] , ss x xx d ∈ + , because of the 
proximity of the poor households. At the outside of the city  , ff x xx d ⎡ ⎤ ∈ + ⎣ ⎦, since there is no 
proximity with the poor households, the only effect is the presence of the rich households.   
Graphic 1 : The amenity function at the beginning of the second period 
 
The dissymmetry of the function of amenities in graph 1 is explained by the fact that 
in the proximity of the segregation point  [ ] , ss x xd xd ∈ −+ , there is a double effect: the 
amenities also increase in the poor area, because of with the proximity of rich households 
[ ] , s s x xd x ∈− , but there is a negative effect in the rich area, because of with the proximity of 
the poor households  [ ] , ss x xx d ∈ + . At the outside of the city  , ff x xx d ⎡ ⎤ ∈ + ⎣ ⎦, since there is 
no proximity with the poor households, the only effect is the presence of the rich person 
  With this modelling the amenities are unlimited. To solve this problem, we supposed 
that they suffer a constant depreciation at a fixed rate  ,(0 1) δ δ < < . Thus, the amenity 
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  In the zones where there are no proximity effects the amenities will be ()  
in the rich zones and 
1( )
t ax δ −+ 1
( ) 1(
t ax δ − )  the poor zones. Inside the proximity zones, the amenities 
increase/decrease linearly, if the rich zone is outside/inside of the segregation point. Finally, if 
the farthest zone from the center is occupied by the rich households, the amenities will also 
increase across the city border, but the negative effect of the poor proximity disappears. This 
increase decrease linearly from the border of the city: () 1( ) 1
t





−+ + . 
We are noting that if a rich zone is surrounded by the poor, the amenities are 
symmetrical: the two effects of proximity are identical from the both sides. This symmetry is 
lost when the rich households occupy the farther zone from the center, since there’s no more 
the negative effect of the poor proximity.   
 
3 STATIONNARY EQLUIBRIA STUDY 
 
In this part we will study the possibility of existence of multiple equilibria. Since there 
are an infinity possibilities of localization, we are interested only in two extreme cases: the 
rich located in the center versus the poor located in the center. Concretely, we want to 
determine under which conditions these two types of structure can be a long-run equilibrium. 
To find the long-run equilibriums, we made the assumption that an infinite time passed. 
 
  3.1. Amenity function and bid-functions at stationary state 
For a depreciation rateδ , the maximum level of the amenities (in the zones which was 
inhabited successively by the rich households) is 1 δ
1. For example, for a fixed depreciation 
                                                 
1 To determine that, we put the condition that where the amenities are increasing more (in the rich zones) they 
remain constant:  ( )
1* * () () 1 () 1 () () 1
tt a x ax ax ax ax
* δ δ
+ =⇔ − + =⇔=  of 10% the maximum level of the amenities is 10. In the zones inhabited successively by the 
poor households and which are not in the proximity of the rich zones, but also outside the city 
(except vicinity of a rich zone) the amenities suffered a continuous depreciation, thus they 
tend towards zero. 
We will determine the amenity function in the proximity areas. Where the amenity 
function is increasing, the external area by the segregation point 
*() s x j  is occupied by the rich 
households. The condition that the amenities are in a stationary state is  . By 













By making the same steps in a proximity area where the amenity function is 










  It remains us to determine the amenities at the stationary state outside the city, but in 
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To simplify the notation, the steady state symbols of the variables are removed, but it 
is known that they are in their stationary state. For the poor households, the bid-function is 
easy to calculate, because they do not have preferences for the amenities: 
()
1 1




It is a decreasing and convex function to the distance from the center. For the rich 
households, this function has a different shape, according to the form of the amenity function.   In the areas occupied successively by the poor households, and which are far 
away from the area rich person so that there are no amenities, the rich bid-function is null: 
1 () 0
a x ψ = . 
In the proximity areas where the amenities increase with the distance to the center, to 
determine the stationary rich bid-function, it is necessary to replace the steady amenity 
function in the bid-function of the rich households: 
() () ()
11
11 1 1 (, ) 2 ( )
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  There is a double effect which exploits the form of this function: a direct negative 
effect (the distance to the center) and a positive one, played by the increase of the level of the 
amenities. Thus, this function is increasing until  ( )( ) 11 1 1 s xy c x d c γγ = +− + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ %  and 
decreasing after this value. One can check easily that  s x xd >− % , but  s x xd <+ % only if 
( 1 2 s yc xd d) 1 γ <+ + . Therefore the function of bidding in this interval is increasing and in 
certain situations (for example when the costs of transport are rather significant compared to 
the incomes and thus the distance effect carries on the amenities effect) it can be decreasing 
starting from a certain point .  x %
  In the "rich" areas, where the amenities are on their maximum level, the biddings of 
the rich households take this form:  
() ()
11
11 1 1 (, )
c xu A y c x u
γ
β β β ψ δ
− − =−  
  One notes that this function equal the rich bid-function without amenities multiplied 
by a constant. Thus, the bid-function is decreasing with the distance to the center. If the most 
last area is occupied by the rich households, their biddings outside the city will be:  
()() ()
11
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d
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γ γ
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This function is decreasing, but more sloping than the preceding one, because the 
negative effect of the distance is reinforced by the reduction of the amenities. The rich bid-
function in the proximity areas where the amenities are decreasing is: 
() () ()
11
11 1 1 (, ) 2 ( )
e
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Now we can pass to the study of the steady state equilibria. We take the situation in 
which all the variables are stationary and we want to show that the two spatial configurations 
(American and European type) can be a long-run equilibrium. More exactly, we want to 
determine all the combinations u1 and u2 for which the two long-run equilibria are possible.    
  3.2. The existence of American type equilibrium 
 
We will start with the existence of the American type equilibrium, with a central 
localization of the poor households and a peripheral localization of the rich households. 
 
Graphic 2: The bid-functions and the amenities at American long-run equilibrium  
 
 
Since the poor households are insensitive with the amenities, their bid-function  2() x ψ  
is continuous and decreasing. For the rich households, there are four situations concerning their bid-function. Thus, in the areas where there are no amenities (for  () 0, s x xd ∈−  and 
( ) , f xxd ∈+ ∞ ), the biddings of the rich households are also null:  11 () () 0
a xx ψ ψ == . In the 
areas where the amenities are increasing ( [ ] , ss x xd xd ∈ −+ ), the rich bid-function 
11 () ()
b x x ψ ψ =  is initially increasing, and in certain situations it can be decreasing. In the area 
occupied by the rich person ( , s f x xd x ⎡ ∈+ ⎣⎤ ⎦ ), where the amenities on their stationary level 
are constant, the bid-function  11 () ()
c x x ψ ψ =  is decreasing. Finally, in the areas where the 
amenities are decreasing ( , ff x xx d ⎡ ∈+ ⎣⎤ ⎦ ), the reduction in these amenities goes reinforces 
the effect of the distance, and thus, the bid-function is more sloping. 
First, we determine the equilibrium level of the endogenous variables and then we will 
check under which conditions this equilibrium exists. To determine the value of the 
segregation point, it is necessary to equalize the biddings in the proximity area: 
( 12 () ()
b x x ψ ψ = ) : 
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For a known agricultural rent, one can easily determine the border of the city by the 
equalization of the rich bid-rent with the agricultural rent ( 1 ()
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The first conditions of existence of American equilibrium are   (if not the city 
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To have rich households in the city, the condition (11) shows that the poor must have a 
lower utility than a maximum level  ( ) 21
M uu  and to have the poor households in the city, the 
condition (12) shows that the utility of the poor must exceed the minimum level  . Thus,  21 ()
m uuwhatever, we have a fork in which the poor utility level must be. This condition is necessary 
for the existence of American type equilibrium.   
After we put the conditions that the two social classes are present in our city, we will 
check that this equilibrium is of American type: there is a single point of segregation and the 
poor households live the center. 
For the most central area of the city 
a
s x xd < − , the bid-function of the rich households 
are null and those of the poor are positive. Thus, we are sure that in this area, there isn’t a 
segregation point and it will be occupied by the poor. 
In the proximity area ( ,
aa
ss x xd xd ⎡ ∈− + ⎣⎤ ⎦ ), there is a point of segregation, but it 
should be checked if that it is unique. In this area, the two equilibrium conditions are surely 
observed if the rich bid-function is increasing in  s x , because the poor-bid function is 
decreasing. 
If  1 ()
b x ψ  is decreasing in 
a
















If the bid-function of the poor is more sloping in  s x , they will occupy the central area 












     (13) 
This condition is always observed because the term on the left is negative and the term 
on the right positive. In the peripheral area of the city ( ,
aa
s f x xd x ⎡ ⎤ ∈+ ⎣ ⎦ ), to check that there is 
not a second point of segregation, knowing that the two functions of bidding are continuous 
and decreasing and  () ( ) 12
ca a
ss x dx d ψ ψ +> +, it should be checked that 
() () () ( 12 2 1 1 2 /
ca a
ff ) x xuu y y A R A
β γ ψ ψδ >⇔ > − − . This condition is true if the condition of 
presence of the rich households in the city (12) is observed because:  :  2 1
γ >
() ( 22 1 2 1 1 12 () () 2 /
mm uu u u u u yyA R A )
β γγ δ >> = − − . Therefore, so that the American 
equilibrium exists, the only conditions are those of presence of the two social categories.   
                                                 
2 see Fujita (1980)  
  3.3. The existence of European type equilibrium 
A European equilibrium is characterized by a central localization of the rich 
households and a peripheral localization of the poor households.   
 
Graphic 3: The bid-functions and the amenities at European long-run equilibrium 
 
In the area where the amenities are at the maximum level (the central area), the rich bid-
function is equal to  1
c ψ  and in the proximity area (for  [ ] , ss x xd xd ∈ −+ ), it is  1
e ψ . At the 
outside of the point  s x d +  the biddings of the rich are null.  
We will use the same approach for a reversed scheme of localization, with the rich 
households occupying the central area of the city. We will determine the equilibrium values of 
the endogenous variables of this scheme of localization and then the conditions necessary for 
the existence of this equilibrium.     The segregation point between the two social classes is obtained by the 
equalization of their biddings in the proximity area  ( 12 () ()
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One finds the same value of the segregation point as in the American scenario. That is 
explained by the fact that the biddings of the rich person in the two situations are symmetrical 
(of reversed slope) and at the point of segregation (in the middle of the proximity area) they 
are identical. 
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  It should be checked that the two social groups are present in the city: 
0 s f x x <<. Since the segregation point is identical for the two scenarios, the condition  
is identical to the American scenario:   
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  It is noted that the conditions (11) and (16) are identical and the functions   and 




m uu ′ () 2
γ δ  and  , which means that the condition 
(17) is more restrictive than the condition (12). 
21 2 1 () () ,  
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  It should now be checked that the point of segregation it is unique and that the 
poor households live the periphery of the city. For any localization more distant from centre 
than 
e
s x xd >+ , the biddings of the rich households are null, thus, this area is occupied by the 
poor and it does not have any segregation point. 
  In the proximity area  ( ) ,
ee
ss x xd xd ∈ −+ , the two bid-functions are decreasing, 
therefore the necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium is that  2() x ψ  is less sloping 
than  1 ()
e x ψ  in 
e
















⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦ >+      (18) Once again, European equilibrium is more restrictive than that American, because 
except the conditions of presence of the two social categories, European equilibrium requires 
an additional condition for the unicity of the segregation point and the "correct" localization 
of the households.   
According to the condition (18), the factors which support the existence of the 
European equilibrium are: a significant difference between the incomes of the two social 
categories, strong preferences of the rich households for the amenities, a short distance of 
proximity and weak transportation costs. Knowing that ()  (see Appendix A), a low 
level of utility of the rich households and strong level of the poor households also support the 
existence of this equilibrium. In our simulations made in the third part of paper, this condition 
is always observed. 
1 2 uu
γ δ > 2
It remains to be checked that in the central area  0,
e
s x xd ⎡ ⎤ ∈ − ⎣ ⎦ , there is not another 
point of segregation. The bid-functions of the two social categories are continuous and 
decreasing in this area. Knowing that at the limit of this zone  ( ) ( ) 12
ce e
ss x dx d ψ ψ −> − 
(because of the condition of unicity of the segregation point in the area of proximity), it is 
enough to check if  ( )( 12 00







γ δ > 2 y
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We cannot determine which conditions (18) and (19) is more restrictive, but the 
condition (19) presents the same elements supporting the European equilibrium. First, there 
are the factors which increase the role played by the amenities in the space structuring: strong 
preference of the rich households for these amenities and a weak depreciation of the amenities 
what leads to high stationary level. The other factors have a direct impact on the biddings of 
the two categories, by increasing those of the rich compared to the poor households: strong 
difference between the incomes, a strong level of utility for the poor and weak one for the rich 
households.   
 
  3.4. The possibility of multiple equilibria 
We are seeking the couples ( , for which the two schemes of localization can be 
equilibrium. For that, we will present another approach, more general, to find the conditions 
of presence of the two categories in the city, which can be applied in the situation when the 
point of segregation cannot be found analytically (for example when the parameters of the 
12 , uufunctions of utility are no more identical). Since 
ae
s s x x = , we will use only  s x  to simplify the 
notation. 
In the "American" scenario, the rich households occupy the peripheral area of the city 
and thus we can fix   and then determine all the values of   for which this space 
configuration is an equilibrium. 
1 u 2 u
  We know that there is a segregation point where the bid-functions are equal. 
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  This function is decreasing on  s x . The behaviour of  1 (,) s f xu is explained by the fact 
that a widening of the poor area results in an increase in their biddings, which makes a 
reduction in their level of utility.  
  We can determine the upper and lower value   as a function of  . For that, it is 
necessary to replace 
2 u 1 u
s x  with the minimal and maximal value in (14), which will give us the 
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  It is not surprising to find the same values of the conditions (11) and (12). The two 
functions are increasing and linear in  ,   being more sloping than 
3
1 u 21 ()
m uu 21 ()
M uu. The values 
of these functions in origins are  () ( ) 22 1 (0) 2 0
m uA R A y y
β γ = −< 2 (0) 0
M u =  and  . If  12 δ < , 
the functions have a slope lower than the unit. The point of intersection of the two lines is: 
() 11
ii uA R A
β γ δ = y . 
  We must restrict the couples ( , ) only to the values with economic significance. The 
level of utility cannot be negative, considering our specification of the utility function (Cobb-
Douglas). Thus, for all the area (0,u
1 u 2 u
i)
4  21 ()0 .
m uu=  With the assumption  12 δ <  (what means 
that the rich have a higher utility level than the poor households), we can define the ensemble 
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As in the American case, we will proceed the same approach to determine the 
conditions necessary for the presence of the two types of households in an “European” city, 
knowing that the additional conditions (18) and (19) are necessary for the existence of this 
equilibrium. This time we will fix   because the poor households live in the periphery. By 
equalizing the bid-functions at the segregation point one obtains   function of  :   
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Even if with the first sight this property appears surprising, it is explained by the fact 
that the widening of the rich area has two impacts. The first is a negative income-effect: to 
occupy a larger area, the rich households must raise their biddings, which decreases their net 
incomes and their utility level. The second is the direct effect played by the amenities: in the 
widened area, the level of amenity is higher (on its maximum level stationary) what results in 
an increase of the utility level. The function   is increasing with  2 (,) s gx u s x  if the amenities 
effect gains over the income effect.  
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These two functions are increasing and linear with  ,   and  2 u 1 (0) 0
m u =
() ( ) ( ) 1 (0) 2 0
M uA R A y y
βγ δ
− = 1 2 − > . To be able to compare the conditions of the two 
scenarios, it is necessary to express the inversed functions of (24) and (25). Since the 
segregation point is identical in both scenarios,   is the inversed function of  , 
while  is not the inversed of  . We will find the same expression as in the 
relation (17): 
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)     (26) With the assumption  12 δ <  (a higher level of utility of the rich households) we can 
define the values of   that allow the European equilibrium (with the additional 
conditions (18) and (19)): for 
( 12 , uu)
() 11 0,
iii uu ∈
5,  ( ) ( ) 22 1 2 max 0, ( ) , ( )
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The values of ( ) 12 , uu  which allow the simultaneous existence of the two types of 
equilibrium (if the conditions (18) and (19) are observed) are represented by dark grey surface 
in the graph 4. The clear grey surface represents the couples ( ) 12 , uu  which allow only the 
existence of the American equilibrium: 
Graphic 4: The utility levels for which two equilibrium are possible 
 
 
The couples ( ) 12 , uu  which simultaneously allow both equilibriums (when the 
conditions (18) and (19) are checked) are the same ones as those for European equilibrium: 
for  ,  () 11 0,
iii uu ∈ ( ) ( ) 22 1 2 max 0, ( ) , ( )
mM uu u u ′ ∈ 1 u
                                                
. Our analysis shows that under certain 
conditions, the two equilibriums are possible, but the conditions necessary for the balance 
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m uu ′  European one are more restrictive. More, European equilibrium is “included” in the American 
one: if European equilibrium is possible, that American it is too  
 
4. EFFICIENCY COMPARISONS 
 
Since our analysis carries within an opened city framework, the utility levels of the 
two categories of households are exogenous and identical for the two types of social 
structures. Thus, to carry out an efficiency comparison between an American and a European, 
it is necessary to compare the surplus of the economy, which in our case is represented only 
by the differential rent.   
In the American case, the differential rent is: 
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and in a european spacial configuration of the city, the differential rent becomes: 
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These two expressions cannot be calculated analytically, thus we will carry out 
simulations. 
In this series of simulation, we fix the stationary parameters relating to the preferences, 
the incomes, the transportation costs and the agricultural rent and thereafter we determine all 
the combinations (  that are respecting the conditions of existence of the two types of 
equilibrium. For all the values   which respect these conditions, we calculate the 
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Table 1 : The values of the stationary parameters 
Parameter  Rich Households  Poor Households 
α /β /γ   0,6 / 0,4 / 0,25  0,6 / 0,4 / 0 
Income 100  90 
Transportation cost  1,5 
Agricultural rent   3 
Depreciation rate of amenities  0,10 
Proximity distance  5 
 
 We  choose  2 0 γ =  (the poor do not have preferences for the amenities) because we 
regard these amenities as a higher good. Moreover, if the rich and the poor have the same preferences for the amenities ( 12 γ γ = ), in this case the rich will always occupy the peripheral 
area of the city, because the amenities do not play any more any role. The income is expressed 
in K/period and the proximity distance corresponds to 50 meters.  
According to conditions' of presences of the two categories in the city, the maximum 
value of   for the American scenario is   and for the European scenario is 
. Since we are seeking the couples 
1 u 1 58,46
ii u =
1 49,16
iii u = ( ) 12 , uu  which allow the existence of both 
equilibriums, the maximum value selected is  .  1
iii u
  In our simulations, we make evolve the two levels of utility from 0 to  , with a step 
of 0,1. After this series of simulations, we note that except some exceptions, for all the values 
of  , the differential rent of an American structure is higher than the differential rent in 
the European configuration. These exceptions appear when the utility levels are very high and 
there is a very significant difference between these levels of utility (the utility of the rich 
households is almost double that the poor one). In these situations, the differential rents in the 
two situations are almost identical:
1
iii u
( 12 , uu)
6.  
To represent graphically the triplets( ) 12 ,, uu R D ∆  we use a step of 0,5 and one utility 
levels higher than 5 (by preoccupation of visibility). In graph 5 we represented in 3D, the 
couples   which allow the existence of two equilibriums and the difference between the 
American and European differential rent: 
( 12 , uu)
Graphic 5: Difference of the differential rents between the two urban structures 
                                                 
=
6  [22.1, 11.6, -0.032], [22.3, 11.7, -0.36], [22.4, 11.7, -0.28], [22.4, 11.8, -0.34], [22.5, 11.8, -
0.68], [22.6, 11.9, -0.70], [22.7, 11.9, -0.98], [22.7, 12.0, -0.36], [22.8, 12.0, -1.05], [22.9, 12.1, -0.76], [23.0, 
12.1, -1.37], [23.0, 12.2, -0.12], [23.1, 12.2, -1.14], [23.2, 12.3, -0.57], [23.3, 12.3, -1.50], [23.4, 12.4, -0.99], 
[23.5, 12.5, -0.16], [23.6, 12.5, -1.39], [23.7, 12.6, -0.63], [23.9, 12.7, -1.08], [24.0, 12.8, -0.08], [24.2, 12.9, -
0.58] 
12 [, , ] uu R D ∆ 
In graph 5, one can see that around the couple( ) 12 20, 10 uu ==  the difference 
between the differential rents is weaker (see negative). Also, on this graph the constraints on 
the two levels of utility are visible. With an increase in the utility levels, the difference 
between the two differential rents is lower.  
We carried out a comparison within a closed city framework (there is no migration 
between cities, and by consequence, the population is exogenous and the utility levels are 
endogenous). We made a comparison between two cities of the same size, with different 
social structures (American type, respectively European). For the size, first we considered 
surface of the city, and second the population. For the two cases, the utility levels reached by 
the two social categories are higher in an American type structure compared to the European 
spatial structure, which confirms the superiority of the American configuration, from a Pareto 
point of view. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  The study of stationary equilibriums shows that the conditions of existence of a 
European equilibrium are more restrictive and included in those for the American type. These 
conclusions are the result of the fact that a European equilibrium requires a temporal process 
of population “switch”.   
First, there are the conditions of presence of the two categories in the city, which are 
more restrictive for the European scenario. For this scenario, there are some supplementary 
restrictions, necessary for an European pattern of the localisation: unique segregation point 
and rich households occupying the centre of the city  Thus, for parameters which satisfy the conditions (11) (12) (17) (18) and (19), the two 
types of equilibriums are possible and we cannot predict which will carry. If these conditions 
are not observed, the only possible equilibrium is of American type. According to these 
conditions the factors which support European equilibrium play on two levels: on the role 
played by the amenities (preference of the rich households, their depreciation) and on the 
biddings of the two categories (the ratio between the incomes and the utility levels of the two 
social categories).   
  Since the levels of utilities are exogenous and identical for the two types of urban 
structures, the comparison between the surpluses released by both type of urban structures 
relates only to the differential rent. This efficiency comparison shows us that, except some 
extreme cases, an American structure is better than a European structure. This fact is true only 
when the parameters of the model allow the existence of the two types of equilibrium.    
Appendix: Relations between the utility levels of the two social categories 
To check that the denominator of  s x  (in both scenarios) is positive (() ), 
we will use the indirect utility functions: 
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− =−  
  At equilibrium, the indirect utility function must be equal in all the localizations to the 
exogenous utility level of each category:   
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  The condition to check ()  becomes :  1 2 uu
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The point where the two bid-functions are equal (with the urban revenue) is the point 
of segregation. By replacing x with  s x  and after simplification, we obtain  , which is 
always true.   
1 yy > 2
It is also noted that if  () 12 2 1
γ δδ <⇒ <  and thus since  ,   must be 
higher than  . This assumption appears probable because a depreciation rate of 
() 12 2 uu
γ δ > 1 u
2 u 12 is very 
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